[redacted]

14 Nov 00

Interviews Conducted by Investigating Officer, CAPT [redacted], USN, on Various Dates

20 October 2000

LT [redacted], USN, who was the ship's Command Duty Officer (CDO) on 12 October, said that he did not carry a weapon while he was standing the watch. Additionally, he said that he did not brief the watch team on the security threat for Aden, Yemen, prior to their assuming the watch.

20 October 2000

LT [redacted], USN, ship's Force Protection Officer, said that he did not go back to CTF 50 after they approved the COLE's Force Protection Plan (Inport Security Plan) for Aden, Yemen, to identify changes (force protection items waived) to the approved plan.

Additionally, LT [redacted] stated that the Commanding Officer gave him verbal authorization to tailor enclosure (1) of the COLE's Force Protection Instruction (COLEINST 3300.55) to meet COMFIFTHFLT requirements outlined in COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01.

21 October 2000

COL [redacted], USMC, COMUSNAVCENT Force Protection Officer, was contacted by telephone in order to provide some expertise on a couple of Force Protection issues. With regard to Force Protection Measure #19 ("inspect all workboats"), he confirmed that the word "inspect" requires the ship to physically board and physically inspect each workboat.

Additionally, he confirmed that COMFIFTHFLT does not conduct a pre-deployment Force Protection brief, INCONUS, for ships that will chop into the FIFTH Fleet AOR but does conduct a Force Protection brief for inchopping ships when they visit U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.

22 October 2000

[redacted]

Interviews Conducted by Investigating Officer, CAPT [redacted] USN, on Various Dates

The COLE's Chief Engineer, LT [redacted], USN, indicated that during the COLE's BSF in Aden on 12 October, the ship had not commenced pumping CHT at the time of the explosion.

22 October 2000

- SKC [redacted], Supply Department LCPO, stated that the Husbanding Agent provided him and the Supply Officer with receipts for 3 CHT barges and 3 garbage barges. The receipts [redacted] are unrecoverable at this time. The Logreq did not request garbage pickup which is something the Chief did not know. The SUPPO was medevac due to injuries and the chief figured she knew.

- LT [redacted] described how the COLE reported deviations to its Force Protection Plans (Inport Security Plans) while operating in the Sixth Fleet. An example he cited was when the ship deviated from its FP plan during its visit to Valletta, Malta, on 4-8 September 2000. The ship deviated from its plan because the plan did not fit the mooring situation. LT [redacted] emailed his point of contact at Sixth Fleet, LCDR [redacted], the N8 of CTF 60 (COMDESRON 22). LCDR [redacted] told LT [redacted] to include the deviations on the ship's port visit after action message.

- CAPT [redacted], the IO, confirmed this was in fact the process the COLE used during its port visit to Valletta, Malta, in a phone conversation on 22 October 2000 with LCDR [redacted], USN (CTF 60/CDS 22), with LT [redacted] participating in the phone call. Additionally, LCDR [redacted] said that if a ship deviated from its approved Inport Security Plan then it should immediately report this fact via hard copy message or phone call/email. He said he did not intend to create a precedent when he authorized the COLE to report its deviations in the manner described above. He said that if a ship deviated from an approved Force Protection Plan that he would expect the ship to communicate with him immediately.

- Ens [redacted] when asked to verify the Inport Section Three Duty Watch Bill by the CO, provided me an

annotated copy of the Watch Bill based on the RADM reports from 22 April - 2 Oct 00. I did not obtain a copy, and [redacted] I was unable to get the latest output from the system on the qualifications.

Ens [redacted] had placed had beside each person's name a Q for qualified, or a NQ for not qualified, a Dink for insufficient progress (behind) or a ? for not on the printouts. For those people that were NQ, ? or Dink, I asked and was given a list by PNC [redacted] of those names and when they reported aboard to give me just a general idea of whether they should be qualified or not. That particular document did not prove beneficial. The CO did say that his duty section that day (12 Oct) was qualified, but because of RADM we could not verify the accuracy of the Watch Bill qualifications.

I did challenge several people's qualifications and PNC [redacted] found that the CDO, [redacted] had a qualification letter which I was provided and QMC [redacted] qualification was in his service record as of 13 Aug 98.

23 October 2000

- The Officer of the Deck (OOD) inport for 12 October 2000, SK1 [redacted], USN, had swapped watches with YN2 [redacted], who had been scheduled for the 0800-1200 watch. OSCS [redacted] was not aware of this. SK1 [redacted] stated that no security brief was conducted that day. He said that the Quarterdeck watches and the topside rovers wore flack jackets and helmets and were carrying weapons.

- STG3 [redacted], was assigned as the forecastle rover, but he stood the internal rover watch. He said that he did not receive a security brief before assuming the watch. He carried a 9-mm sidearm for his watch.

- TM3 [redacted] was assigned as internal rover, but stood the watch of topside forecastle rover. He said that he did not receive a security brief. He carried a 12-gauge shotgun during his watch.

Interviews Conducted by Investigating Officer, CAPT [redacted] Holland, USN, on Various Dates

- LTJG [redacted], USN, the Assistant Force Protection Officer, knew that 19 items had been waived from the ship's force protection plan, and he did not know why the ship did not go back to CTF 50 for approval of those waivers.

- LTJG [redacted] commented that many of the ship's Force Protection training records were difficult to come by, because the majority of the records were electronically placed in the Relational Administrative Database Manager (RADM) system of which was the server in a flooded space, making it impossible to recover the information.

- Per the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and LT [redacted] and LTJG [redacted], the USS COLE was conducting frequent daily ops/intel briefs, as well as "Med-Arabian University" briefs with such subjects as CJCS ROE and Force Protection (reference POD's 8 Aug-12 Oct). The target audience was Officer's, Chiefs, CIC and bridge watch standers not on watch.

- LT [redacted] attended formal Force Protection Officer/Anti-Terrorism Training Officer (FPO/ATTO) training from 12-16 June 2000 in Little Creek, VA.

- OSCS [redacted] did not know that the USS COLE was in THREATCON BRAVO until the night of 11 October. As the Inport Watch Section Leader for 12 October, he thought the Rovers were in flack jackets and helmets. Senior Chief [redacted] said that GMC [redacted] (a medevac after the explosion), the Combat Systems Duty Officer (CSDO), was usually responsible for briefing the duty sections on the threat, etc., every duty day. He confirmed that the Inport Watchbill was not signed by him or the Senior Watch Officer (LT [redacted] LT [redacted] also confirmed that the Inport Watchbill was not signed.

- Statements by SK1 [redacted] (Inport OOD), TM3 [redacted] (topside forward Rover), and STG3 [redacted] (internal Rover):

  → [redacted] said he was qualified to stand the watch, and he carried a 9MM sidearm.

[redacted]

→ [redacted] said he was qualified to stand the watch, and he carried a 12-gauge shotgun.
→ [redacted] said he was qualified to stand the watch, and he carried a 9MM sidearm.
→ [redacted] said that the Petty Officer of the Watch (POOW), SH2 [redacted], carried a 9MM, the Messenger of the Watch (MOOW), SN [redacted], had a 12 gauge, and the aft Rover, SN [redacted], carried a 12 gauge shotgun. He also stated they were not briefed prior to standing duty.
→ [redacted] also said that the Rovers and sentries did have two means of communication: WICS and a whistle.

- TM3 [redacted] stated that he did not receive a security brief and had no idea of the THREATCON prior to assuming the watch of Forecastle Rover on 12 October 2000 (he thought it might be Alpha). During his watch he was concerned about a soldier on the pier that had an AK-47. (According to the XO the soldier was on the pier when the COLE arrived). Petty Officer [redacted] saw the white boat (suicide boat) approach the bow from about the 11 o'clock direction (relative). He heard the word passed on the 1MC for dumping trash, and thought the white boat was a trash barge. He moved to the starboard side to check on the guy with the AK-47 and after that heard the explosion.

- The XO reports that the soldier with the AK 47 was on the pier when they arrived.

- LTJG [redacted] described the process by which the USS COLE's Threatcon Implementation Plan gets generated: the AFPO obtains information on the THREAT Level for the port and any other pertinent information about the port; then the AFPO and the Anti-Terrorism Training Officers (ATTOs) meet and discuss any special considerations; they write an initial THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan and route it through the FPO, the XO, and the CO. Once all have agreed, the ship sends a Force Protection Plan message to its ISIC. Once the ISIC approves the requested Force Protection Plan, the AFPO and FPO produce a final THREATCON Implementation Plan for the CO's approval.

- LTJG [redacted] knew that the Threatcon Implementation Plan (TIP) should have been done 10 days prior to the ship's arrival in Aden, Yemen, but he said he only

[redacted]

received notice about the scheduled BSF in Aden around 3 or 4 October 2000. He indicated that the FPP was approved the day before pulling in. He did not know why the ship did not report back to CTF 50 about the deviations to their approved plan.

- LTJG [redacted] was holding onto bills from the ship's cancelled Physical Security instruction in order to develop training plans. Because the ship's Force Protection Instruction was new, many items in the instruction were not fully developed. For example, the Emergency Action binder was not completed; the Force Protection Review Committee (FPRC) had not met yet (per XO). Additionally, they had not started any formal classroom training with the Ship's Security Defense Force (SSDF).

- LTJG [redacted] said that COMFIFTHFLT OPORD on Force Protection is not on COMDESRON FIVE ZERO's pre-deployment CD-ROM, but he did obtain the document from the Sipr net on COMFIFTHFLT's website.

- CO/XO confirmed: regarding the OPS/Intel and the Med/Arabian University briefs, the following personnel attended: all officers and CPOs not on watch; Combat Information Center (CIC) and bridge personnel not on watch; port and starboard personnel (shift workers) and those unable to make the briefs, received a copy of the brief to read and sign for.

- CO: determining qualifications was extremely challenging as all entries were in the Relational Administrative Database Management (RADM) system, which was located in a flooded space [redacted]

25 October 2000 / Various Interviews

- Per the XO, LCDR [redacted], USN, is the Executive Officer (XO) of the USS COLE (DDG-67). The XO assumed his present position on 20 December 1999. The XO had not started conducting Force Protection Review Committee meetings, due to the fact that the ship's instruction was only a month old.

[redacted]

Interviews Conducted by Investigating Officer, CAPT [redacted] USN, on Various Dates

- The CO and FPO (LT [redacted]) confirmed that neither the bridge nor the signal bridge was manned during the ship's inport BSF in Aden, Yemen.

- The CO and FPO said that the CO delegated LT [redacted] to waive Force Protection measures as necessary.

- The CO and FPO confirmed that the SAT team was not manned during the inport BSF in Aden, Yemen. Additionally, they confirmed that the Internal Rover watch replaced the Sounding and Security watch, and the Internal Rover (STG3 [redacted] was armed on 12 October 2000.

- The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and the FPO commented that they used the Hawes, Cook, Taylor and Barry's after port visit reports (lessons learned).

- LT [redacted] commented that OSCS [redacted] came to him while he was on the forecastle during sea and anchor detail and said he was going to muster all the day's security forces to brief them. It was confirmed later that OSCS [redacted] did not brief the inport watch.

- Sk1 [redacted] and YN2 [redacted] swapped watches, as SK1 had the 0800-1200 OOD.

- [redacted] and [redacted] through verbal direction from OSCS [redacted] ended up standing opposite watches on the watchbill.

- OSCS [redacted] did not remember directing [redacted] and [redacted] to different watches and did not know [redacted] and [redacted] had swapped watches.

- LT [redacted]/OSCS [redacted] confirmed that ammunition bearers and messengers (BAF) were not briefed.

- LT [redacted] provided the current casrep list. [CTF 50 111800Z Oct 00.]

- LTJG [redacted] provided muster sheets for Force Protection training covering the period 17 Nov 99 - 9 July 00. Muster sheets for later periods are missing due to the fact the records were in the Chiefs mess and it was destroyed.

[redacted]

- CO/XO/LT [redacted]: said that they did not obtain the CENTCOM Vulnerability Assessment (VA) for Aden, Yemen.

- LCDR [redacted], JAGC, USN, a member of the JAGMAN investigation team, had difficulty getting a copy of the CENTCOM VA for Yemen. The site has restricted access and is password-protected. He had to acquire a password from a member of the NAVCENT Force Protection staff in order to gain access to the site and download the material. Also the VA is dated in 1998 and has a Xerox copy of a note on the second page that a comment is written non-approved. This should be updated.

- CO provided the frame number for Refueling Station 3 – Frame 126.

- LTJG [redacted] reported that their Level 1 Training materials were from the Little Creek FPO/ATTO Training Course that they attended.

- CO/XO/LT [redacted]/LTJG [redacted]: said they used "lessons learned" messages for Aden, Yemen, from the USS HAWES, USS DONALD COOK, USS BARRY, and USS TAYLOR, and no others.

- CO/LT [redacted]: did not see the latest threat assessment and security overview for Aden, Yemen, DNCIS 221930Z Sep 00.

- CO: The applicable weapons posture is directed in CTF 50 night intentions message, and the last one before the ship's entry into Aden, Yemen, was CTF 50 111800Z Oct 00.

- ENS [redacted]: confirmed that while he was standing the Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) watch during sea and anchor detail, a small trash barge came along the ship's port side aft prior to the completion of the mooring. The bridge passed to the aft phone talker that the ship was not taking any barges alongside at the time. LT [redacted] directed him to ensure that the vessel had cleared and he did so, reporting that the vessel had already moved twenty feet away from the ship.

25 October 2000 / Observations of the Investigation Officer

I walked the areas where the sentries forward and aft would be positioned during their watches. The aft Rover has a poor view of anything forward of the missile deck. The forward Rover has a poor view of anything aft of the forward bulkhead of the superstructure.

The Bridge wings and the Signal Bridge (with the "Big Eyes") areas have the best views of port and starboard, but neither station was manned during the inport period of 12 Oct 00.

27 October 2000 / Observations of IO (cont.)

The following is a general idea and timeline of workboats and when they arrived and departed as presented by SK3 [redacted] (escort for the husbanding agent):

Approx. 1020 - [redacted] came out from the port break and saw a garbage barge	Garbage barge amidships port side - about where explosion took place between frames 174-220. [redacted] also saw CHT boat and a garbage boat, side-by-side, just forward of the missile deck.
Approx. 1100	CHT boat left. Cheng and SK3 [redacted] confirmed they did not pump. Garbage barge forward of missile deck shifted by port side of flight deck.
Approx. 1105	Boat located amidships departed.
Approx. 1110-1115	[redacted] saw a white boat (suicide boat), approximately 18 feet long, coming down the port side.

27 October 2000 (Continued)

- LT [redacted]: said that the date of the Force Protection brief he gave was 17 Aug 00.
- From LT [redacted] (Ops Officer): acquired the COMDESRON 50 CD-ROM (classified SECRET) that was provided for Middle East Force (MEF) deployers. LTJG [redacted] and Lt [redacted] report that the disk did not cover Force

Protection. When Lt [redacted] check the CD out, we found that it does link to COMUSNAVCENT Force Protection web site.

- LT [redacted]: the Internal Rover watch took the place of the Sounding and Security watch.
- CO: Force Protection exercise muster sheets (after the last exercise in July) were [redacted] destroyed [redacted]
- OSCS [redacted]: Duty Section 3 watchbill was posted in its own place outside ship's office.
- Navigator (LT [redacted]): Neither Bridge nor Signal Bridge was manned. LT [redacted] did not know that one of them was supposed to be manned during THREATCON Bravo.
- SK1 [redacted] (Inport OOD): He just did not make the log entry regarding the person on the pier (with the AK-47) that TM3 [redacted] was so worried about.
- [redacted] (member of SAT Team): Didn't know he had duty and was not carrying a weapon.
- XO: ship was only taking on F-76 in Aden.
- OPS (LT [redacted]): Does not have any records that show that those who missed the OPS/INTEL morning briefs signed for and read the briefs.
- LT [redacted] when asked who the ammunition bearers and messengers were, he responded that they were the Back up Force (BAF).

28 October 2000

- LT COL [redacted], the USDAO Sanaa, Yemen, when asked if any other ships had put boats in the water, he replied that the USS Barry did and though the Yemenis got upset initially they agreed to allow the ship to keep their boats in the water.
- Per conversation with SK1 [redacted] and TM3 [redacted] the after Rover was somewhere approximately forward port on the missile deck. TM3 [redacted] was just forward and inboard of the forward, starboard .50 cal. SK1 [redacted] was at the quarterdeck, starboard side between the two stacks. STG3 [redacted] reported that he was somewhere forward on the 01 level - exact location unknown. A drawing will be furnished in the report to show approximate locations.

Interviews Conducted by Investigating Officer, CAPT [redacted] USN, on Various Dates

29 October 2000

- Per phone conversation with LT COL [redacted], USDAO he states that he does not know why the Logreg reply from the USDAO Sanaa, Yemen only went to Cole and authorized me to call MSGT [redacted] who sends them out.
- Also, there are no security measures that Arab Investment Manufacturing and Trading Co. provide for USN ships.
- There are no briefs provided for the ships upon arrival Aden, Yemen. If they (the Embassy) visit a ship and they have in the past (maybe 4-5), it is because they are in the area on business.
- Regarding the previously mentioned boat issue with USS Barry, the USDAO stated that it may have not been the Barry and he could not remember who it was, but when he explained to the Ministry of Defense that it was one of our requirements, there was not an issue anymore and was approved.
- Per conversation with MSGT [redacted] of the Am Embassy USDAO, he just did not place any of the other addressees that were on Cole's Logreq. He said that they normally try to limit the number of addressees.

31 October 2000

- Per Lt [redacted] 2-M-60's were on the Bridge Wings.

[redacted]

CAPT, U.S. NAVY

[redacted]